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There is a trend among institutional investors to split their assets between index-
managers and specialists. The specialist mandates are typically delegated to
specialist asset managers, who are assumed to generate "alpha", take on large
risks and whose remuneration is performance based.
In this paper, we will study how the optimal behavior of the specialist man-
ager will depend on the remuneration structure.Keywords Incentives, portfolio choice, sustainable investments, value func-
tion.
subject JEL classi¯cation G23
11 Introduction
This paper highlights the e®ects on asset manager behavior, due to changes in
the incentive schemes.
Variable incentive schemes are increasingly an important part of the total
remuneration of asset managers by investors. Specialized managers in private
equity, hedge-funds, etc are also increasing their share of managed assets. The
total compensation to the asset manager is often a ¯xed fee and an incentive
fee based on the excess return (if positive) related to some index; both of these
fees are then proportional to the size of the mandate.
Some of the quoted reasons for this trend are: alignment of interest between
investors and asset managers; the best assets management companies can there-
fore attract the most skilled individuals; and it allows the investor to allocate
a smaller portion of total assets to a few (idiosyncratic?) specialist managers
keeping the residual assets with a cost-e®ective index manager. Specialist as-
set managers, either with respect to the type of assets they manage, or with
respect to the investment process; are therefore often those managers with in-
centive schemes.
Outsourcing the management of assets, introduces a principal (manager)
agent (investor) relationship. This paper has therefore its origin in the agency
literature.
Our analysis of managerial behavior is in terms of optimal choices between
two risky assets and the manager is assumed to be maximizing the expected
utility of his income. Four di®erent managerial remuneration schemes are con-
sidered, including such with high-water mark based bonuses and liquidation due
to poor performance of the fund. The high-water mark and liquidation setting
was considered from a fund value perspective using a continuous time stochas-
tic di®erential equation model by Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross [3], and by
Hodder and Jackwerth [4] for an expected utility maximizing manager that has
the choice of a risky asset and a riskless one. As will be seen below some of our
results bear resemblance to those of [4]. As opposed to Goetzmann, Ingersoll
and Ross [3], and Hodder and Jackwerth [4], the lower barrier considered in our
work is not a ¯xed one, but rather one that is a fraction of one of the risky assets
in which the manager is assumed to invest. The issue of which benchmark to
2use is addressed by Admati and P°eiderer in [1].
We analyze managerial behavior in the four di®erent remuneration schemes
for both single time period and multi period settings. The results in the single
time period problems can be found as partial results in the multi period settings.
For example, the optimal choice in a single time period high-water mark setting
starting with a fund value of one is the same as the optimal choice when both
the fund value and high-water mark are one in the last period in the multi
period setting.
Our work also aims at proposing incentive structures for environmental or
corporate social responsibility (CSR) oriented funds. These incentive structures
may have high-water mark based bonuses, but their key feature is to yield extra
managerial income if the environmentally friendly (CSR or green) asset beats
the conventional (index or black) asset during a given time period.
It is also our wish to ¯nd contracts which force the manager to invest the full
amount provided by the investor in the manager's own (green) strategy. This
relates to the work of Dybvig, Farnsworth and Carpenter [2].
2 The model
Here we specify the model that governs the development of the fund value.
We assume that the capital to be handled by the manager is initially equal to
1. At time points t¡1, for t = 1;:::;T, the manager allocates capital according
to
¸t¡1eXt + (1 ¡ ¸t¡1)eZt;
where eXt represents a "green" investment and eZt represents some "conven-
tional" or "black" investment. The choice ¸t¡1 is a real number between zero
and one. Letting ~ Yt¡1 be the fund value at the time of choice, the fund value
at time t is
Yt =
¡
¸t¡1eXt + (1 ¡ ¸t¡1)eZt¢ ~ Yt¡1:
In accordance with the Black-Scholes model, we assume that for t 2 f1;:::;Tg,
Xt are i.i.d. Gaussian random variables with mean ¢(¹ ¡ 0:5¾2) and variance
¢¾2 and that Zt for are i.i.d. Gaussian random variables with mean ¢(º¡0:5¿2)
3and variance ¢¿2. Here ¢ is a time-scaling factor. We also assume that Xt and
Zt are correlated with correlation parameter ½ > 0.
The manager is assumed to have skills allowing him to compose a portfolio
with higher yield than the benchmark. The manager's portfolio is also assumed
to be more risky than the benchmark. In all numerical runs below these features
are re°ected in that the green asset (represented by eXt) has higher volatility
and slightly higher positive drift than the black asset (represented by eZt), i.e.
¾ > ¿ and ¹ ¡ 0:5¾2 > º ¡ 0:5¿2. The restriction ½ > 0 is due to the fact
that the "green" asset is a portfolio with some components equal to those of the
"black" asset.
Gaussian random variables are chosen for transparency. This is no restriction
to our approach and we could just as well have chosen to work with some other
distributions.
The fund value is registered by the investor at the discrete time points
t 2 f1:::;Tg;
and at each time point the manager receives a ¯xed fraction, denoted ®, of the
fund value and if he performs better than the "conventional" asset he receives
a fraction, denoted ¯, of the excess return. The contract may also be of high-
water mark type where the manager receives the ¯ fraction only if the fund
value is recorded at an all time high. We denote the managers fee at time t
by ©t. Letting f(¸t¡1) = ¸t¡1eXt + (1 ¡ ¸t¡1)eZt, the value of the fund Yt is
assumed to be evolving according to
Yt = f(¸t¡1)(Yt¡1 ¡ ©t¡1); (2.1)
where ©t¡1 is the manager's reward at time t ¡ 1. Henceforth
~ Yt = Yt ¡ ©t: (2.2)
The remuneration schemes considered are;
Setting I This is the simplest setting and aims at forcing green investments.
Here the green investment has to be monitored at a higher value than the black
investment in order for the manager to receive his bonus. If this requirement
is ful¯lled the manager is awarded an amount proportional to the di®erence in





®¢f(¸t¡1) + ¯ max
©








Setting II The second type of reward is a development of Setting I and
includes a lower barrier. This barrier is a fraction of the black investment. In
order for the manager to be able to earn the full fee, the value of the fund has to
be above the lower barrier at all monitoring points up until the time of reward
claim. If the value of the fund is below the barrier at a monitoring point the
manager loses his mandate and will only be rewarded a "welfare" amount at
the current and remaining monitoring points. Letting a be the welfare amount
for one time period, It be the value of the black investment, ± be the fraction




, we have in this case that
©t(¸t¡1) =1(k = 1)¢a + 1(k = 0)
³
¢a1(Yt < ±It)
+1(Yt ¸ ±It)[¢®f(¸t¡1) + ¯¸t¡1Mt] ~ Yt¡1
´
; (2.4)
where k = 1 indicates that the manager has lost his mandate.
Setting III The third remuneration scheme considered gives the manager the
¯ fraction only if the fund has reached a high-water mark (i.e. a new maximum
relative to the maximum of fund values from previous monitoring points) at the
time of reward claim. Letting Ht = maxfYt;:::;Y1;1g be the high-water mark,
we have in this setting that
©t(¸t¡1) =
³
®¢f(¸t¡1) + ¯¸t¡1Mt1(Yt > Ht¡1)
´
~ Yt¡1: (2.5)
Setting IV The fourth setting utilizes a high-water mark bonus and a barrier
that is a fraction of the conventional investment (or index). Just as in Setting II
the manager is knocked out and earns only welfare amounts (at the monitoring
point and in remaining time periods) if the fund value is below the barrier at
some monitoring point. We have that
5©t(¸t¡1) =1(k = 1)¢a + 1fk=0g
³
1(Yt < ±It)¢a (2.6)
+1(Yt ¸ It±)
h






Unless otherwise noted, parameters used in numerical runs are speci¯ed in the
tables below.
For the distributions of the stochastic variables driving the asset prices we
set parameters according to
green asset green asset black asset black asset correlation time
expected volatility expected volatility between scale
return return green & black
¹ ¾ º ¿ ½ ¢
0.08 0.3 0.03 0.2 0.7 1.0
And for the remuneration schemes we set
¯xed bonus risk lower welfare discount
fee fraction aversion barrier amount rate
fraction percentage
® ¯ ° ± a r
0.02 0.2 2 0.8 0.001 0.015
3 Theoretical analysis
Here we brie°y outline the methodology for solving the optimization problems
at hand.





6and letting r be the discount rate, the manager's aim is to maximize the expected



















with respect to ¸0;:::;¸T¡1. The maximization will be done using dynamic
















where St¡1 is the state of the system at time t ¡ 1. Results from the dynamic
programming literature, e.g., Stokey, Lucas and Prescott [5], give that the value














for t 2 f1;:::;Tg, and where VT+1 ´ 0.
So, at time t = T ¡ 1 we are to ¯nd the number ^ ¸T¡1(s) such that
























At time points t = T ¡2;:::;0, the problem is to ¯nd the numbers ^ ¸t such that








¯ ¯St = s
#
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Proceeding backwards recursively, we ¯nd the array of optimal choices
f^ ¸0; ^ ¸1(s1);:::; ^ ¸T¡1(sT¡1)g:
To solve numerically for the optimal choices, a tree of the state space going
into each time period is spanned and the value function and the optimal choice
are computed at each node of the tree using the optimization and interpolation
routines in matlab.
74 Single period problem
In the one period problem there is only one choice variable ¸. Below we present
our numerical results on how the optimal choice ^ ¸ depends on the parameters










































Figure 1: The optimal choice ^ ¸ in Setting I as a function of ® and ¯.
In Setting I the optimal choice is 0:5 if there is no bonus, i.e. if ¯ = 0. We
also note that there is a point close to the origin where the manager allocates
all capital in the green asset. This indicates that it is not necessary for the
investor to give the manager a large ¯xed fee or a large bonus in order to push
green investments. Of course this is dependent on the parameters chosen for










































Figure 2: The optimal choice ^ ¸ in Setting II as a function of ® and ¯.
As one would expect, the introduction of the barrier yields overall less allo-
cation in the more volatile asset. We also note that the optimal choice is now
8decreasing in ® for ¯ = 0. This means that, when no bonus is available, the
manager is willing to take on more risk in order to earn a larger ¯xed fee. For
Setting I and Setting II it is also interesting to see that for low values of ®,
i.e. small ¯xed fees, the optimal choice is decreasing in ¯. This has to do with
the fact that the bonus part of the manager's fee is linear in ¯ and ¸. With
a small ¯xed fee, a manager with CRRA utility is not willing to take on extra
risk to earn a larger bonus. An increase in ¯ is compensated by a decrease in ¸
























Figure 3: The optimal choice ^ ¸ as a function of ® and ¯ in Setting III.
Just as in Setting I the optimal choice in Setting III is 0:5 if there is no








































Figure 4: The optimal choice ^ ¸ as a function of ® and ¯ in Setting IV.
Introducing the barrier in the high-water mark setting gives an even more
drastic change in managerial behavior than adding the barrier to Setting I.
9Just as in Setting II the optimal choice in Setting IV is decreasing in ® for
¯xed ¯.
Simulations of 100000 runs with ® = 0:02 and ¯ = 0:2 in the di®erent
settings gave the following means, 25%- and 75%-quantiles for the manager's
¯xed fee, bonus and total fee. For reference, we also give the optimal choices
used.
Setting I II III IV
optimal choice 0.9615 0.3869 0.9999 0.3856
upper bound 0.0252 0.0238 0.0254 0.0238
¯xed fee 0.0216 0.0210 0.0217 0.0210
lower bound 0.0170 0.0177 0.0169 0.0176
upper bound 0.0348 0.0057 0.0357 0.0104
bonus 0.0221 0.0036 0.0220 0.0075
lower bound 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
upper bound 0.0591 0.0286 0.0607 0.0343
total fee 0.0437 0.0247 0.0437 0.0285
lower bound 0.0170 0.0177 0.0169 0.0176
Clearly, earning bonuses in SettingII and SettingIV, i.e., the settings
with barrier, is not an easy task. The high-water mark setting without barrier
(Setting III), gives on average almost 500% higher bonuses than Setting II.
Under our assumption of power utility U(x) = x1¡°=(1 ¡ °) with ° = 2, the
mean total fees in SettingII and SettingIV have to be increased by approx.
77% and 53%, respectively to give the same utilities as the mean total fees in
Setting I and Setting III.
For the investor the fund value after rewarding the manager is of course of
great interest. In the table below we give the mean and 95% con¯dence bounds
in the four di®erent settings.
10Setting I II III IV
upper bound 1.0390 1.0280 1.0408 1.0233
fund mean 1.0378 1.0266 1.0390 1.0219
lower bound 1.0354 1.0252 1.0371 1.0205
Clearly, Setting I or Setting III is what the investor would prefer. Ac-




This is the simplest setting considered where at each monitoring point the man-
ager is awarded a ¯xed fraction of the of the fund value and another fraction of
the fund value given that the green investment is monitored at a higher value
than the black investment. In mathematical terms, the fee ©t at time t can
written
©t(¸t¡1) = (®¢f(¸t¡1) + ¯¸t¡1Mt) ~ Yt¡1:
For notational convenience we let
g(¸t¡1) = ®¢f(¸t¡1) + ¸t¡1¯Mt: (5.7)
At time t = T ¡ 1 the optimal choice is


















where y is the fund value at the time of choice, i.e. instantly after the manager
is rewarded the amount ©T¡1. Due to independence of the g(¸) and ~ YT¡1, the
optimal choice is independent of the fund value y. The optimal choice ^ ¸T¡1 is
found using the "fminbound" routine in matlab. The value function VT is the
right hand side of (5.8) with the argmax¸ replaced by sup¸. At time t = T ¡2,
11the optimal choice is








¯~ YT¡2 = y
#
;
where ~ YT¡1(¸) is the fund value at time t = T ¡ 1 given that choice and fund
value at t = T ¡ 2 are ¸ and y, respectively. Using equations (2.2), (5.7) and
(5.8), we have, for t 2 f1;:::;Tg, that



















[f(¸) ¡ g(¸)]g(^ ¸T¡1)
´1¡° i
:
Again, the optimal choice again is independent of the current fund value. Pro-
ceeding recursively backwards we ¯nd the remaining optimal choices ^ ¸0;:::; ^ ¸T¡3.
The backward recursion also yields that all optimal choices are independent of
the fund values.
For some speci¯c choices of ® and ¯ the optimal choices over four time
periods are
® ¯ ^ ¸0 ^ ¸1 ^ ¸2 ^ ¸3
0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
0.01 0.1 0.721 0.769 0.839 0.962
0.2 0.672 0.717 0.780 0.884
0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
0.02 0.1 0.706 0.759 0.840 0.999
0.2 0.690 0.745 0.825 0.962
0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
0.03 0.1 0.679 0.733 0.817 0.977
0.2 0.682 0.741 0.830 0.985
We note that with parameters as chosen here the optimal choices are in-
creasing over time unless the bonus option is removed (i.e. unless ¯ = 0).
125.2 Setting II
This setting introduces a barrier that is a fraction of the conventional investment
or index. If the fund value goes below some fraction of the index, the manager
loses his mandate and is considered "out". Letting ­t be the "in-out" variable,
where ­t = 0 means "in" and ­t = 1 "out", It be the value of the conventional


































The value function VT is given by replacing argmax¸ by sup¸. At time t = T ¡2
the optimal choice, given that IT¡2 = i, ~ YT¡2 = y and ­T¡2 = k is












IT¡2 = i; ~ YT¡2 = y;­T¡2 = k
#
;
where IT¡1, ~ YT¡1(¸) and ­T¡1(¸) are the index value, fund value and in-out
value at time t = T ¡ 1 given that the choice at time t = T ¡ 2 is ¸ and given
that IT¡2 = i, ~ YT¡2 = y and ­T¡2 = k.
Proceeding backwards recursively we ¯nd the optimal choices and value func-
tions for the remaining monitoring time points.
For a four period setting, the optimal choices are displayed below.
The optimal starting choice is



































































Figure 7: The optimal choice ^ ¸3 in Setting II
14For choices ^ ¸1 and ^ ¸2 we note that for fund values high above the index
value the proportion invested in the riskier (green) asset is close to one. This
behavior is re°ected by the fact that the bonus is linear in the choice variable.
As the fund value approaches the barrier, which is 80% of the index value, the
risk taking decreases. But very close to the barrier, when the manager is close
to losing his mandate, a "when in trouble double" type of behavior is displayed.
Below are histograms of the optimal choices for 100000 simulated runs. From





























Figure 8: The optimal choices from 100000 simulations in Setting II.
It should be noted that the choice is zero only when the manager loses his
mandate. From the histogram to the right, we see that the manager loses his
mandate in roughly one percent of the runs. Compared to Setting I with
® = 0:02 and ¯ = 0:2, we note that allocations in the more volatile green asset
are less on average. We also see that allocation in the green asset is increasing
on average.
5.3 Setting III
Here the manager receives a ¯xed fraction of the fund value and a bonus fraction
given that the fund value at the monitoring point exceeds the fund values at
all previous monitoring points, i.e. the fund value reaches a high-water mark.
This means that the optimal choices are dependent on the current values of the
fund and high-water mark, denoted y and h, respectively. It should be noted
that the high-water mark is recorded before rewarding the manager and that
the fund value is recorded after rewarding the manager. With St = (~ Yt;Ht).





U(©t(¸)) + Vt+1(~ Yt(¸);Ht)































(1 ¡ ®¢) ~ f(¸)y ¡ ¸¯ maxfex ¡ ez;0g1( ~ f(¸)y > h);
~ f(¸)y1( ~ f(¸)y > h) + h1( ~ f(¸)y · h)
´
fXZ(x;z)dxdz;
where ~ f(¸) = ¸ex + (1 ¡ ¸)ez and fXZ is the joint density of Xt and Zt. The
optimal choices ^ ¸t¡1, for t = 1;:::;T, are given upon replacing the sup on the
right hand side of (5.9) by argmax.
Below are the optimal choices in Setting III for four periods. The optimal
starting choice is
^ ¸0 = 0:999:
The the second, third and fourth optimal choices as functions of the fund value
and the high-water mark are found in the graphs below.






















































: The optimal choice ^ ¸1 in Setting III after the ¯rst period as a
function of the fund value and the high-water mark.
16In the ^ ¸1 plot we see that for low fund values the manager optimally "goes all
in" in the green asset. We also note a ridge where the fund value is slightly below
the high-water mark. This implies that in these cases the manager optimally





























































: The optimal choice ^ ¸2 in Setting III after the second period as a
function of the fund value and the high-water mark.
The ^ ¸2 plot bears similarities with the ^ ¸1 plot but here we also see slightly
lowered risk tasking when the fund value is very low. This is due to the fact
that earning a large ¯xed amount here will decrease the fund value to an extent
such that the sum of the ¯xed fee earned here and the ¯xed fee earned in the





























































: The optimal choice ^ ¸3 in Setting III after the third period as a
function of the fund value and the high-water mark.
17We note some quite drastic di®erences in the plots of optimal choices. Using
the terminology of Hodder and Jackwerth [4] there is an "option ridge" present
in the plots for ^ ¸1, ^ ¸2, but not for ^ ¸3. This is in accordance with the ¯ndings
of Hodder and Jackwerth [4] for the case where the "black" asset or index is
replaced by a riskless one. In the ^ ¸2 and ^ ¸3 plots we also see the "Merton °ats"
for high high-water marks and low fund values, where the manager invests as if
the bonus is unattainable. At the the straight line where the fund value equals
the high-water mark the optimal choice exactly the as in the one period problem.
Below are histograms of the optimal choices for 100000 runs. From left to
right we see ^ ¸1, ^ ¸2 and ^ ¸3.





































Figure 12: The optimal choices from 100000 simulations in Setting III.
Going chronologically through time periods, we see that the choices are
increasing on average. This means that the manager optimally takes on more
risk as he approaches termination of his contract. We also note that even though
the Merton °at is rather large in ¯gure 11, trajectories only end up here in
roughly ¯ve percent of the runs, whereas the optimal choice is one or very close
to one in a little less than 80 percent of the runs.
5.4 Setting IV
Here a high-water mark bonus is combined with a barrier that is a fraction
of the conventional investment or index. Letting St = (It;Ht; ~ Yt;­t) and s =
(i;h;y;k), the optimal choice at time t = T ¡ 1 is




























(¢®f(¸) + ¯¸MT1(f(¸)y > h))y
i´1¡°
:
The value function VT(s) is given by replacing argmax¸ by sup¸. The optimal
choices at t ¡ 1 = 0;:::;T ¡ 2 , given that St¡1 = s are















where St(¸) = (It;Ht(¸); ~ Yt(¸);­t(¸)) are the index value, high-water mark,
fund value and in-out value at time t given that the choice at time t ¡ 1 is ¸
and given that It¡1 = i, Ht¡1 = h, ~ Yt¡1 = y and ­t¡1 = k.
The numerical results, in a four period setting, are as follows; The initial
optimal choice is
^ ¸0 = 0:064:
The second, third and fourth optimal choices as a functions of the index and


























































: The optimal choice ^ ¸1 in Setting IV after the ¯rst period as a























Figure 14: The optimal choice ^ ¸2 in Setting IV after the second period as a
function of the fund value and the index with the high-water mark ¯xed at 2:7.
In ¯gures 13 and 14 we see some indications of the "when in trouble double
behavior" that is also seen in Setting II. This behavior will become more
obvious with ¯ner numerical resolution. The option ridge, which also can be
seen in ¯gures 9 and 10 and in the work of Hodder of Jackwerth [4], is present.
The intuition is that for fund values slightly below the high-water mark the
manager is willing to allocate all capital in the riskier green asset to have a
chance of earning a bonus. We see Merton °ats in ¯gures 14 and 15. These
occur when there is no obvious chance of earning a bonus and this is the case
for fund values that are su±ciently smaller than the high-water mark but not




























































: The optimal choice ^ ¸3 in Setting IV after the third period as a
function of the fund value and the index with the high-water mark ¯xed at 3:7.
20Below are histograms of the optimal choices for 100000 runs. From left to































Figure 16: The optimal choices from 100000 simulations in Setting IV.
As in Setting II, the presence of the barrier gives less allocation in the more
volatile green asset compared to the more risk friendly incentive structures in
Setting I and Setting III. We also note that allocation in the green asset is
increasing on average.
5.5 Comparison of the four di®erent settings
In this section we compare the performance of the manager between the four
settings. We also look at the di®erences in terminal fund values, which is inter-
esting from the investor's point of view.
Below we display the means, 25%- and 75%-quantiles for the manager's ¯xed
fees, bonuses and total fees, at time points t = 1;2;3;4, in the four di®erent
settings.

































Figure 17: Fees in Setting I.





























Figure 18: Fees in Setting II.



































Figure 19: Fees in Setting III.


































Figure 20: Fees in Setting IV.
Clearly, Setting I or Setting III is what the manager would prefer as these
settings yield the highest rewards on average. We note that in Setting III and
Setting IV, i.e. the settings with high-water mark bonus, the 75%-quantiles are
below the means. This indicates that there are some substantial bonuses paid
to the manager in runs where the fund values increase drastically. In Setting
III and Setting IV, we also see that more than 75 percent of the runs yield
no bonus in the last time period.
From the investor's point of view, the terminal fund values are of course of
most interest. In the below table we give the mean, 25%- and 75%-quantiles for
the fund values at termination.
Setting I II III IV
upper bound 1.4187 1.3124 1.4469 1.3047
mean 1.1452 1.0772 1.1683 1.0760
lower bound 0.7050 0.7404 0.7067 0.7473
As seen above the introduction of a lower barrier induces less allocation in
the riskier green asset and this is re°ected here in that the spread between upper
and lower bounds for Setting II and Setting IV are narrower than those for
Setting I and Setting III. Also the barrier-less settings have higher terminal
fund value means than the ones with barrier, so from the investor's perspective
a barrier is not necessarily a good thing even though it may reduce losses.
23Also, since the manager's main task is to beat the index we the fund values
relative to the index in the table below.
Setting I II III IV
upper bound 1.1858 1.0276 1.2281 1.0184
mean 1.0057 0.9517 1.0298 0.9530
lower bound 0.7749 0.8771 0.7670 0.8852
From this table it is clear that the introduction of a barrier is on average
not feasible at all for the investor. Also the only incentive scheme that seems
to be able to generate substantial wealth for the investor is Setting III.
6 Conclusions
We have seen that di®erent features in portfolio managers' remuneration schemes
lead to quite drastic di®erences in optimal choices between two risky assets. Es-
pecially, we have noted that the introduction of a barrier decreases risk, but on
the other hand it gives less opportunity for the manager and investor to maxi-
mize their pro¯ts. We have also seen that the barrier gives birth to a desperate
type of behavior when the fund value is very close to the barrier. From a cor-
porate social responsibility point of view, we have proposed a simple incentive
structure (Setting I) that may yield substantial income at least for the man-
ager. Combined with a high water mark, i.e. Setting III, also the investor has
a fair chance of earning substantial amounts. We have also found that some
features present in the high-water mark setting with a risky asset and a riskless
one, as in the work of Hodder and Jackwerth [4], are still present when the
riskless asset is replaced by another risky asset.
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